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Transactions: WSEAS TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
Transactions ID Number: 32-786
Full Name: Xuehao Wei
Position: Engineer
Age: ON
Sex: Male
Address: Elektrovej, Building 325, room 029, 2800 Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark
Country: CHINA
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E-mail address: zjuseed@gmail.com
Other E-mails: IWEM09@gmail.com
Title of the Paper: Preventing Over-offering Behavior in Capacity Markets
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Number of paper pages: 10
Abstract: Capacity markets provides additional revenue stream for the power suppliers. In a capacity-energy combined market environment, suppliers have incentives to deliberately over-offering their capacities in the capacity market while bid very high price in the energy and ancillary markets to avoid operation. This paper analyzes the risks and profits of this capacity-over-offering behavior, and develops a method for computing non-operable penalty level which can prevent the capacity-over-offering behavior. It is found that the effective penalty level is highly correlated with the stochastic characteristics of supplier¡¯s profit streams and supplier¡¯s risk attitudes. Two types of suppliers are suggested as the potential cheaters in the analysis. The methodology and the results are potentially useful for the operation and mitigation in a capacity-energy market environment.
Keywords: Capacity Market; Over-offering; Risk Analysis; Non-operable Penalty; Prospect Theory; Monte-Carlo Simulation
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